Proof architecture

Why VishwaasAI proof is different.

Don't take our word for anything. That's the point.

Most consent tools ask you to trust their database. Vishwaas is built on the opposite principle: a consent record should be verifiable without trusting Vishwaas at all. Three named cryptographic mechanisms make that true — and you can check our working.

The three mechanisms

Named standards, not promises.

Every proof claim rests on one of these three. Each is a published standard you can verify independently.

01SHA-256

SHA-256 hash chain

Every consent record carries the SHA-256 hash of the record before it. Change any record after the fact and the chain visibly breaks at that position and every position downstream — tampering becomes self-evident rather than deniable.
02RSA-2048

RSA digital signatures

Each record is signed with RSA-2048 keys held inside an AWS KMS HSM. The signature is cryptographic proof of origin and integrity, and the signing key never leaves hardware — not even your DBA can produce a valid signature out of band.
03RFC 3161

RFC 3161 trusted timestamps

An independent timestamp authority countersigns each event under RFC 3161, binding it to calendar time. Verification stands on the third-party timestamp — it never depends on trusting Vishwaas's own clock or database.
Try it

Try to change history.

The chain isn't a diagram on a slide — it's the record itself. Tamper with any link and watch every link after it break.

Try to change history.

Edit any field below. Watch every downstream record fail verification.

CR-1041computing…
Principalarjun.mehta@example.in
Timestamp2026-04-02T09:14:00Z
prev hash: computing…
hash: computing…
CR-1042computing…
Principalpriya.nair@example.in
Timestamp2026-04-03T11:38:00Z
prev hash: computing…
hash: computing…
CR-1043computing…
Principalrahul.iyer@example.in
Timestamp2026-04-05T16:02:00Z
prev hash: computing…
hash: computing…

Simulation for illustration — production records are signed server-side with HSM-held keys and RFC 3161 trusted timestamps.

The gap

What a timestamp+IP log cannot show.

The contrast is the whole argument.

A log records the event. A chain proves the record.

A timestamp-and-IP log tells you that, according to a database row, consent was captured at a moment from an address. It cannot tell you whether that row is the same one written that day, because nothing binds the row to the records around it or to an independent clock. Anyone with write access can change the flag, move the timestamp, or insert a row after the fact, and the log looks identical. A hash chain, signature, and RFC 3161 timestamp close every one of those doors: the record is bound to its neighbours, signed by a key that never left hardware, and countersigned by an authority you don't have to trust Vishwaas to believe. That is the difference between a record the regulator takes on trust and one they can independently verify.
See it in context

The same proof, vendor by vendor.

Ask every platform on your shortlist to name its mechanism the way we just did.

vs KavachOne

Timestamp + IP log vs a hash chain that makes alteration self-evident.
See the comparison →

vs Redacto

An unspecified 'audit trail' vs four named, verifiable mechanisms.
See the comparison →

vs PrivacyEngine

A GDPR-adapted model vs DPDP-native proof and residency.
See the comparison →

Bring your hardest 'prove it' question.

30 minutes with a privacy engineer. We run the verifier on real data, break a chain on purpose, and show you exactly what holds up in front of the Board.